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INTRODUCTION
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Plaintiff/Appellee Ruth
Ann Jefferies petitions the Court for rehearing on the single issue of whether this Court
should award her fees and costs incurred in this Court.
PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
On May 11, 1995, this Court rendered its decision in this case in an opinion entitled
Jefferies v. Jefferies, Case No. 940373 (slip opinion) (Utah App. 1995) (a copy of that
opinion is attached as Addendum "A"). In that decision, the Court affirmed the trial
court's decision in part and reversed and remanded for further consideration in part. The
Court held that the trial court correctly considered Mr. Jefferies' retirement plan established
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1988) ("401a plan") as a marital asset when dividing the
marital estate. The Court further held that the trial court was without jurisdiction to revoke
gifts totaling $145,000 to the parties' children. However, the Court in reversing that portion
of the award noted that on remand the trial court could consider Mr. Jefferies' dissipation of
that amount in determining an equitable division of the marital estate. Unfortunately, the
Court's decision neglected to address Ms. Jefferies' request for attorneys' fees on appeal.
See, pages 21-22 of Brief of Appellee. In doing so, the Court ignored its own precedent
that, in domestic cases, if a party is determined by the trial court to be in need of assistance
in paying attorneys' fees and is awarded fees and substantially prevails on appeals, then this
Court affirms that finding and awards attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending an
appeal as well.
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ARGUMENT
This Court's prior decisions make clear that Ms. Jefferies should be awarded fees and
costs incurred on appeal if she demonstrates: (1) she was awarded fees and costs below,
and, (2) she substantially prevailed on appeal. Since both conditions have been satisfied in
this case, the Court should grant rehearing in order to amend its opinion to include
instructions that the trial court on remand should award Ms. Jefferies the fees and costs she
has incurred in this appeal.
In Schaumberg v. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah App. 1994), this Court
held:
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (Supp. 1993) grants court's discretion to
award attorneys' fees in domestic cases. Trial courts have discretion to
award fees so long as the award is based on findings regarding the need
of the receiving spouse, the ability of the payor spouse to pay and the
reasonableness of the fees. When a trial court has awarded fees at trial
based on such findings, and when the receiving spouse has prevailed on
appeal, we will award attorneys' fees on appeal and remand solely for
the trial court to make the foregoing findings.
(Citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also, Shelton v. Shelton, 885 P.2d 807, 808 (Utah
App. 1994) ("Because Mrs. Shelton was awarded attorney fees and costs at trial and has
prevailed on appeal, we award reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in responding to
this appeal to Mrs. Shelton, and remand to the trial court for determination of the amount);
Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 967 (Utah App. 1994) ("Ms. Hill was awarded partial attorney
fees by the trial court and it is conceded that she substantially prevailed on appeal. We
therefore award attorney fees and costs on appeal subject to the trial court's determination on
remand that Ms. Hill is in continued need of financial assistance, that the requested fees are
reasonable and that Mr. Hill has the ability to pay the award").
2

Here the trial court specifically found:
The court further concludes that a reasonable attorneys' fees in this
amount would be $18,750 given the difficulty of the case, the issues
involved in the result. The court concludes that the Plaintiff [Ms.
Jefferies] has the ability to contribute to said attorneys' fees but is
without sufficient funds to pay all her fees without a substantial
invasion of the marital estate given her income. The court finds that
Defendant [Mr. Jefferies], given his superior earnings ability, has the
ability to contribute to such fees and orders that he does so in the
amount of $8,750.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 21 (a copy of the trial court's Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law is attached as Addendum "B").
This Court's opinion affirmed the trial court's ruling that Mr. Jefferies' retirement
benefits held in the 401(a) plan should be considered as part of the marital estate. That
ruling agreed completely with Ms. Jefferies' argument in Point I of her brief. See, Brief of
Appellee at 8-14. This Court's ruling that the "retirement funds accumulated in a 401(a)
plan during marriage are marital assets and were appropriately considered by the trial court"
demonstrates that Ms. Jefferies clearly prevailed on appeal on this issue. Jefferies. slip op.
at 5.
Ms. Jefferies likewise prevailed on the second issue addressed by the Court. While,
this Court found held that the trial court was without jurisdiction to revoke the fund transfers
made to the parties' children, the net effect on the marital estate on remand will be
unchanged. That is, the amount included in the marital estate will be the same because a
party who dissipates marital assets during the marriage is responsible for that amount to the
other spouse upon dissolution of the marriage. As noted in the Court's opinion in this case,
the Court's prior decision in Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 479 (Utah App. 1988),
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stands for the proposition that if a spouse dissipates assets during the marriage, the trial court
should consider the amount of the dissipated assets in valuing the marital estate and in
equitably dividing the estate.
Here, the Court ruled that the trial court erred in revoking these transfers. However
the Court specifically stated that on remand:
[I]n making an equitable division between the spouses, the trial court,
given the findings of fact in this case, may take into consideration the
transfers made by Mr. Jefferies to the children at the expense of Ms.
Jefferies. Although the trial court cannot reach the children's separate
assets, it can hold Mr. Jefferies accountable to Ms. Jefferies for a
dissipation of marital assets.
Jefferies, slip opinion at 5.
This is substantially the same position that Ms. Jefferies stated on pages 21 and 23 of
her brief where she argued that this Court could have affirmed the division of marital assets
on appeal on the alternate legal basis that the award could be upheld because Mr. Jefferies
had "dissipated marital assets."
Here, the trial court should find, and indeed as outlined in this Court's opinion
effective did find, that Mr. Jefferies dissipated the $145,000, add that amount to the marital
estate, and consider the $145,000 when equitably dividing the property. Under this situation,
the net result will be the same for Ms. Jefferies. She will receive one-half of the $145,000.
This result is basically the result of the trial court: "These transfers are void and the monies
are considered to be and are ruled to be part of the marital estate." Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law at 8. The end result on remand will be the same even if based on the
alternate theory of dissipation as opposed to the theory of a void transfer.
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Based on this Court's precedent and these facts, it is clear that Ms. Jefferies has
substantially prevailed on appeal. That is, the two issues that Mr. Jefferies raised on appeal:
1) the 401(a) plan should not be considered part of the marital asset; and, 2) the $145,000
should not be considered part of the marital asset, have both been rejected. As outlined
above, as the prevailing party in domestic cases who was awarded partial attorney fees
below, Ms. Jefferies is entitled to a determination and award by the trial court of reasonable
attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Jefferies is entitled to the award of attorney fees and costs she has incurred on
appeal. Accordingly, this Court should grant rehearing on that narrow issue and instruct the
trial court to consider the proper amount of fees and costs to award.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Rule 36 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, counsel for Petitioner.
Ruth Ann Jefferies certifies that this Petition is presented in good faith and not for the
purposes of delay.
DATED this^Lday of May, 1995.

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
RALPH E. CHAMNESS
Counsel for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing
PETITION FOR REHEARING to be mailed to the following counsel of record, postage
prepaid this 2 2 . day of May, 1995:
Clark W. Sessions, Esq.
Jay W. Butler, Esq.
CAMPBELL, MAACK AND SESSIONS
One Utah Center
201 South Main Street, Thirteenth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215
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This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MAY 1 1 1995
COURT OF APPEALS

ooOoo
Ruth Ann Jefferies,

OPINION
(For Publication)

Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 940373-CA

Wilbur R. Jefferies,
Defendant and Appellant.

F I L E D
(May 11, 1995)

Second District, Davis County
The Honorable Rodney S. Page
Attorneys:

Clark W. Sessions, Jay W. Butler and Rodney R.
Parker, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
David S. Dolowitz, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Wilkins.
WILKINS, Judge:
Wilbur Jefferies appeals the trial court's division of
marital assets under a final decree of divorce. We affirm in
part, and reverse and remand in part.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Mr. Jefferies, as an employee of an inter-governmental
agency, has participated in a retirement program that includes a
plan implemented pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1988) (401(a)
plan). The 401(a) plan is offered and administered by the agency
in lieu of participation in the federal social security system.
The trial court considered the funds that had accrued during
marriage in Mr. Jefferies' 401(a) plan as marital property. Mr.
Jefferies appeals this determination. Whether a 401(a) plan can
be considered marital property is a question of law, which we
review for correctness. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936
(Utah 1994).
The second issue involves transfers by Mr. Jefferies of
money totaling approximately $145,000 to accounts in the names of

the couple's two children. The trial court found that the
transfers were made without the knowledge of Ms. Jefferies and
"as such were fraudulent and were an attempt . . . to hide assets
from [her]." Therefore, the trial court voided the transfers and
considered the funds to be part of the marital estate. Mr.
Jefferies argues first that because the funds were transferred as
gifts to the children under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act
and because the children were not before the court, the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to void the transfers. This presents a
question of law, which we review for correctness. Xd. If the
court is found to have jurisdiction over the children's accounts,
Mr. Jefferies then challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
leading to the trial court's conclusion that the transfers were
fraudulent. Mr. Jefferies argues that the evidence of fraud is
not clear and convincing. We will defer to the trial court's
factual determinations unless they are clearly erroneous. Ij3. at
935.

CONSIDERATION OF 401(a) FUNDS AS MARITAL PROPERTY
Section 30-3-5(1).of the Utah Code states: "When a decree of
divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties.11 Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1994). Construing
this section regarding whether the trial court properly
considered a husband's accrued retirement fund as a marital
asset, the supreme court held in Enqlert v. Enqlert, 576 P. 2d
1274 (Utah 1978):l
It is to be particularly noted that that
language is in general terms and contains no
hint of limitation. The import of our
decision implementing that statute is that
proceedings in regard to the family are
equitable in a high degree; and that the
court may take into consideration all of the
pertinent circumstances. It is our opinion
that the correct view under our law is that
this encompasses all of the assets of every
nature possessed by the parties, whenever
obtained and from whatever source derived;
1. The relevant language of this section has not been
significantly altered since the Enqlert case. In 1978, this
section read: "When a decree of divorce is made, the court may
make such orders in relation to the children, property and
parties, and the maintenance of the parties and children, as may
be equitable.11 Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1978).
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and that this includes any such pension fund
or insurance.
Id. at 1276 (footnote omitted).
Considering retirement benefits in a later case, the supreme
court re-emphasized its position in Englert, stating: "[T]he
court may take into consideration all of the pertinent
circumstances. . . . If the rights to [retirement] benefits are
acquired during the marriage, then the court must at least
consider those benefits in making an equitable distribution of
the marital assets." Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432
(Utah 1982). In addition to describing the policy of considering
all assets acquired during marriage, the supreme court in
Woodward described the quality of a marital asset in the context
of retirement benefits. Speaking of retirement benefits as an
economic resource, the court said:
Whether that resource is subject to
distribution does not turn on whether the
spouse can presently use or control it, or on
whether the resource can be given a present
dollar value. The essential criterion is
whether a right to the benefit or asset has
accrued in whole or in part during the
marriage. To the extent that the right has
so accrued it is subject to equitable
distribution.
Id. at 432-33.
Accordingly, two principles are clear from the law of this
state. First, all assets acquired by the parties during marriage
are to be considered by the trial court when making an equitable
distribution, unless the law specifically prevents the court from
considering a particular asset. Second, a marital asset is
defined functionally as any right that has accrued during the
marriage to a present or future benefit.
The funds that accumulated in Mr. Jefferies' 401(a) plan
during the marriage clearly fit the functional definition of a
marital asset. Further, there is no statutory or case law that
prevents the trial court from considering the 401(a) plan a
marital asset. Therefore, not only was it proper for the trial

940373-CA
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court to consider Mr. Jefferies' 401(a) plan as a marital asset,
it was required.2
FUND TRANSFERS TO CHILDREN
Mr. Jefferies argues that the trial court was without
jurisdiction to order the return of the approximately $145,000
that had been transferred to the children under the Uniform
Transfers to Minors Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-5a-101 to -123
(1993). Although raised for the first time on appeal, an issue
of jurisdiction may be so raised. State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578,
583-84 (Utah App. 1992).

2. The fact that participation in a 401(a) plan is in lieu of
participation in the federal social security plan does not change
the result. An asset is to be considered if it meets the
functional definition of a marital asset. Funds in a 401(a) plan
meet the definition, as they represent a right accrued during
marriage to receive a present or future benefit, while payments
into the federal social security plan do not. See Fleming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610, 80 S. Ct. 1367, 1372 (1960) ("To
engraft upon the Social Security system a concept of xaccrued
property rights' would deprive it of the flexibility and boldness
in adjustment to ever-changing conditions which it demands.").
In addition, Congress has enacted its own scheme of social
security benefits for divorced spouses. See 42 U.S.C. § 402
(Supp. 1995) . This, among other things, has led many courts to
conclude that Congress has preempted state divorce laws and,
therefore, social security benefits cannot be considered marital
property. See, e.g., Olsen v. Olsen, 445 N.W.2d 1, 11 (N.D.
1989). Because the consideration of expected social security
benefits as marital assets is not directly at issue in this case,
it is unnecessary for us to reach this question.
However, we note that even absent the argument that Congress
has preempted any consideration of social security benefits as
marital property, under our law, social security would have no
place in the consideration of marital assets in this case.
Unlike the §401(a) plan here, social security benefits have no
present asset value. They do not vest in any meaningful way
until one meets age and other requirements imposed by federal
law. Contributions toward social security cannot be withdrawn,
borrowed against, assigned, given away, or otherwise treated as a
present asset. Clearly, any other form of "right" or "plan" that
is similarly unavailable prior to retirement would also not be a
marital asset for purposes of pre-retirement division or
distribution.

940373-CA
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A transfer made pursuant to the Uniform Transfers to Minors
Act "is irrevocable, and the custodial property is indefeasibly
vested in the minor." Utah Code Ann. § 75-5a-112(2) (1993). It
is beyond the jurisdiction of the court when dividing marital
assets between the parents in a divorce proceeding to reach
assets of the children. We therefore must remand this case to
the trial court to divide the assets equitably without the
inclusion of the children's accounts. Of course, in making an
equitable division between the spouses, the trial court, given
the findings of fact in this case, may take into consideration
the transfers made by Mr. Jefferies to the children at the
expense of Ms. Jefferies. Although the trial court cannot reach
the children's separate assets, it can hold Mr. Jefferies
accountable to Ms. Jefferies for a dissipation of marital assets,
See Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P.2d 476, 479 (Utah App. 1988).
Because we hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
reach the children's accounts, we need not reach the issue of
whether the elements of fraud were met by clear and convincing
evidence.
CONCLUSION
We hold that retirement funds accumulated in a 401(a) plan
during marriage are marital assets and were appropriately
considered by the trial court. We also hold that the trial court
was without jurisdiction to reach the funds transferred by Mr.
Jefferies to the children pursuant to the Uniform Transfers to
Minors Act. We therefore remand this case to the trial court for
an equitable division of the marital assets consistent with this

opinion."

Michael

Wilkins, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Russ^Jri W. Trench,

J a m e s xZ>^Davis,

940373-CA
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN I Hh St:C< INI' f II HUAl. DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RUTH

• JES,
Plaintiff,

—oooOOOooo—
)
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

) Civil No y24701612DA

WILBUR R. JEFFERIES,

) Judge: Rodney S. Page

Defendant.

)
—oooOOOooo-—

The above-entitled matter came before the court, the Honorable Rodney
S. Page presiding for trial on the 9th

,HI<J

M)lh day ot December, H.isn, with the closing

argument on December 15, 1993. The Plaintiff was present in person represented by
counsel, David S. Dolowitz. The Defendant was present in poisiin represented by
counsel Rodney R. Parker. The court after hearing the evidence of the parties and the
arguments of counsel, ruled on certain matters from the bench at the conclusion of trial
and reserved h i liiilh'i nihiiu. the issues of property division, alimony and related
matters. Having considered those matters and being fully advised in the premises, the
court issued its ruling on the 18th day of February, 1994. Accordingly, the court makes

and enters the following as its

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff was a resident of Davis County, State of Utah the date

this action was filed and had been so for more than three (3) months immediately prior
thereto.
2.

The parties are husband and wife having been married November

3.

Irreconcilable differences arose between the parties which made

10, 1973.

continuation of their marriage relationship impossible.
4.

Two children were born as issue of this marriage, Nicole L. Jefferies,

born on January 7, 1977, and Lon Mark Jefferies, born May 7, 1980. Pursuant to the
stipulation of the parties, care, custody and control of the minor children of the parties
should be awarded to the Defendant subject to reasonable visitation as that is defined
in Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-35. Provided, however, the relationship between the
children and Plaintiff is strained. For that reason, visitation is something that will have
to be worked out between Plaintiff and the children. Recognizing that problem and that
the children may not be willing to go to stay over night, the court orders visitation every
other Saturday and at least four hours on an evening during the off week.
5.

The court finds that Mr. Jefferies has, if not purposely, at least

subjectively, interfered with visitation by planning competing activities with the children
on periods of time which were designated for visitation by the children with the Plaintiff,
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and in that way, subjectively interfered with custody and the relationship between the
Plaintiff and the children.
The court also considered the purchase of the vehicle for Nicole which
encumbered the Defendant in the amount of $400.00 per month, if not outright, at least
a subtle attempt m his purl to adversely influence the children against their mother.
The court further finds that the Defendant has exercised undue influence
over the children in order to gain their favor by tl le pui chase of the piano, which was
entirely inappropriate given the temporary status of this matter, and the fact that the
child, Nicole, was primarily concerned with the violin during this period of time

It also

served to riivert assets of the marriage.
6.

The Defendant should be enjoined and prohibited from planning

activities with the children wtiirh compete with their visitation with their mother and from
otherwise interfering with visitation.
7.

The Plaintiff is employed with the Utah State Tax Commission and

earns an income of approximately $2,246.00 per month and receives $300.00 per month
from a rental of a room in her home and will also receive approximately $300.00 per
month interest inrom" "It nit Hie cash awarded her in this action.
_. The Defendant is employed with Wasatch Front Regional Council and
is paid a salary of $7z',0uiJ nu annually wim i

IJIIOSS

income of approximately $6,000.00

per month.
9.

The court finds that through their employment, bath parties may

maintain health

accident insurance on the children. The court determines that the

3

Defendant should maintain the primary health and accident insurance on the minor
children subject to that being available through his employment and the parties are to
share any uninsured medical expenses with the Plaintiff paying one-third and the
Defendant paying two-thirds. The Defendant shall pay any regular office and ordinary
medical expenses. The Plaintiff is to share only in the extraordinary uninsured medical
expenses.
10.

By application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines of the State

of Utah, the Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant the sum of $307.00 per month as child
support for the two minor children of the parties. Child support should continue for each
child until that child attains majority and graduates from high school with his/her regularly
scheduled graduating class.
11.

Both parties were employed prior to the marriage and acquired

property which they brought into the marriage in the form of savings. The Plaintiff
brought in $17,000.00 to $18,000.00 into the marriage and these funds were used to
purchase the home on Elaine Drive and for other family expenses.
12.

Approximately one month prior to the marriage of the parties,

Defendant purchased a home for $39,200.00. He used $17,000.00 of his premarital
funds as a down payment on this home. He took title to this property in his name alone.
The home on 1062 East 2200 South purchased by the Defendant prior to the marriage
of the parties remained in his name. The mortgage payments and upkeep were paid
for from marital funds throughout the marriage of the parties. In 1981 this original home
was sold for $100,420.00 to the "Dones". As part of the purchase price, the Buyers
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conveyed two lots to the Defendant and paid $18,000.00 in cash. The Buyers also
assumed the mortgage for approximately $18,000.00. Two lots were conveyed to the
Defendant in his name (Lot 28 and Lot 52 of Quail Brook) Lot 28 was valued at
$24,000.00. Lot 52 was valued at $38,000.00. Pursuaiit to agreement, Defendant sold
Lot 28 back to the "Dones" on June 3, 1982 for $20,300.00 and subsequently sold Lot
52 for $29,000.00 on March 3, 1988 to "Dubach" for $15,000.00 down and $14,000.00
with interest witln'ri oile year. Fhere was no evidence produced as to what happened
with the proceeds of sale of the home in 1981 or the sale of two perspective lots. There
is no evidence that the funds went into any surplus accounts or were traceable to certain
assets so as to maintain their separate identity.
13
certain stock

Prior to her marriage to the Defendant, Plaintiff received

.ift of

lutual fund) from her uncle. That stock has remained intact and in her

name. The parties have done nothing with that particular asset during the course of their
marriage.
The parties own two homes which they purchased during their
marriage:

3730 South Bountiful Boulevard and 2267 Elaine Drive ii i Boi intifi il, Utah.

Parties purchased the home on Elaine Drive as an investment in 1974 and used the
same as a rental property until October of 1992 when the Defendant and the children
moved into if Th« hi irie at 3730 South Bountiful Boulevard was purchased in 1981 and
was the family's home at the time that this action was filed. The Defendant and children
voluntarily moved ff

i Ilir limine on Bountiful Boulevard before this action was filed and

moved into the home on Elaine Drive. The Plaintiff has continued to reside in the
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Bountiful Boulevard home and the Defendant and two children in the Elaine Drive home
throughout the pendency of these proceedings. The children continue to attend the
schools that they attended when they lived in the Bountiful Boulevard home.
15.

The home on Bountiful Blvd. is the larger of the two homes. It has

an appraised value of $225,000.00 with a mortgage balance of $61,394.00 leaving an
equity of $163,606.00.
16.

The home on Elaine Drive was appraised at $113,000.00.

It is

subject to a mortgage of $36,880.00 leaving an equity of $76,120.00.
17.

Each of the parties have vehicles. The Plaintiff has a 1987 Subaru

Wagon valued at $4,100.00. The Defendant has a 1986 Olds Toronado valued at
$2,900.00 after deducting a sum required to repair certain body damage. The Defendant
has also purchased a 1991 Subaru Sedan valued at $11,200.00 with a loan balance of
approximately $10,600.00.
18.

The parties have an airplane which they own as part of a business

known as Flying Start. The parties have agreed the plane has a value of $55,453.00.
They have also agreed that the plane should be awarded to the Plaintiff subject to an
obligation on it of $15,135.00 leaving a net value on the plane of approximately
$40,318.00. There is also a spare airplane engine worth approximately $200.00 as
parts.
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During the course of the marriage, the Defendant has been part of

an investment group that has purchased interests in real estate. In so doing, he has
acquired a one-third interest in 9.69 acres in Salt Lake County; and an 8.25 percent
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interest in approximately 26 acres in Salt Lake County; and a one-forth interest in certain
property known as the Jordan Heights property in Salt Lake County The value of the
9.69 acres is $68,000.00 and the interest of the Defendant is $22,966.00. The value of
the 26 acres in which the Defendant has an 8.25 percent interest is $50,200.00 and the
interest of the Defendant is $4,141.00. The value of the Jordan Heights Partnership
property is $103,400.00, and the Defendant's one-quarter interest is worth $25,850.00.
20. . The court finds the Defendant boi i owed some $32,000' 00 froi i i the
Oswald Profit Sharing Plan to repay certain credit lines in connection with the video
business and the Flying Start Company in 1992. To secure payment of those funds, the
Defendant gave a trust deed not secured by the 9.69 acres and pledged his interest in
the Jordan Heights Partnership. The note was amortized over 9 years and remains in
the balance of appmximratelv $28,000 0(1 OWIIM

1 lodwcnnj the faalanoe owing on the

note from the Defendant's interest in the 9.69 acres and the Jordan Heights Partnership,
leaves a net value on those properties of approximately $20,816.00.
21.

rhe court finds the Defendant's partners in the land ventures appear

to be accommodating, allowing him to use his interest to secure loans and to have the
sai i ie investment and • mership goals as the Defendant. Therefore, the court does not
discount the value of these properties because of the Defendant's minority interest
therein. Further the court finds these values weie established by wain -ition loi pn ipoit/
tax purposes. The court takes judicial notice of the fact that traditionally these values
are at least ten percent below fair market value. The court finds any difference in value
caused by the Defendant's minority interest is more than offset by the actual value of
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these properties.
22.

The Defendant purchased a condominium in March, 1992. The court

finds he has equity of $5,000.00 in that condominium.
23.

At the time of the separation the parties had a savings account with

First Security Bank with a balance of $10,995.00. The Plaintiff has used that account
for her benefit during the pendency of this matter.
24.

The Plaintiff has a 401K Plan with a value of $12,716.00.

25.

During the marriage, approximately $145,725.00 was placed in

accounts at Dean Witter Reynolds in the children's names pursuant to the Uniform Gift
to Minors Act.

The court has determined that those deposits were made by the

Defendant without the knowledge of the Plaintiff. They were fraudulent and were an
attempt by the Defendant to hide assets from the Plaintiff and transfer them to the
parties' children under his control. As such they were fraudulent, not only upon the
Plaintiff, but also upon the marital estate. These transfers are void and the monies are
considered to be and are ruled to be part of the marital estate.
26.

While the parties were married, savings accounts have been set up

in the childrens' names at Shearson Lehman. These accounts have been funded
primarily from earnings of the children while working in the family business and from
various gifts they have received. A total of $20,448.00 has been paid to Nicole from the
business from 1988 - 1992 and there has been a total of approximately $22,664.00
deposited in her Shearson Lehman account over that same period. Lon over the same
period has been paid approximately $20,453.00 and approximately $23,395.00 has been
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deposited in his account at Shearson Lehman during the period. Those sums which
were deposited in the Shearson Lehman accounts constitute the majority of the earnings
which the children have had during that period of time. There may have been some
other incidental amounts which have been deposited.
The Defendant withdrew $15,000.00 fiom Nicole's account supposedly in
conjunction with her in the purchase of the condominium. This is a matter between the
Defendant and Nicole.
A $7,000.00 amount was withdrawn from Lon's account in 1991, and a
bond was purchased at Dean Witter Reynolds. The bond which can be traced hom the
$7,000.00 withdrawal is I oil's separate property.
27.

The Defendant has various life insurance policies on his life which

have accumulated a cash value.

•••

meficial life policy I las a cash value of

$3,399.00. A Penn Life policy has a cash value of $700.00 and a Principal Mutual policy
has a cash value of $659.00.
28.

I he Plaintiff has a life insurance with Beneficial Life with a cash

value of approximately $775.00.
I i

[here am life insuuiince policies on the children with accumulated

cash values, which are the property of the children.
30.

The Wasatch I'ront Regional Council has opted out of the social

security systems, so they have a separate retirement system for their employees. The
system provides for retirement by allowing the employees to invest
is administered I

m addition, the Wasatch Front Regional Council
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contributes a matching amount into a separate plan known as the 401(a) which is
administered by Principle Financial. The retirement plans provide many advantages over
social security. Under the 457 Plan, all funds accumulated are paid to the employee
upon termination of employment, death, disability or unforseen severe financial
emergencies. The recipient, upon retirement can elect a lump-sum distribution, periodic
payment or certain other alternatives. Under the 401(a) Plan, the employer makes a
contribution on behalf of the employee, however, the employee can also make voluntary
contributions. The contributions made by the employer are totally vested upon death,
retirement, or termination. The employee has several options for payout including lumpsum. Under this Plan any contributions made by the employee may be withdrawn at any
time, but withdrawal prior to age 59 1/2 may be subject to a ten percent penalty by the
Internal Revenue Service. Under either of the Plans, all funds in the accounts may be
passed to beneficiary upon property designation.

The Defendant presently has

$233,412.00 in his 457 Plan and $222,800.00 in his 401(a) Plan. All sums were
accumulated during the marriage.
31.

The Plaintiff has minimal state retirement; having drawn out some

$30,800.00 in January of 1981 to apply toward the purchase of the parties'* home.
32.

The Plaintiff has some social security eligibility.

33.

In 1986 the parties opened a business known as the "Video Palace".

Over the years the children have worked in the business and the earnings therefrom,
were the primary source of the children's savings accounts in Shearson Lehman. The
business has been operating for 7 years and has provided income to the parties. The

10

assets of the business, in addition to actual videos themselves, consist of certain
computer equipment, a 1983 Dodge Van, and a hot air balloon. Various experts were
called to evaluate the business. These valuations ranged from a low of $30,000.00 to
$35,000.00 to a high of $169,000.00. The method of depreciation is the crucial factor
in valuation. It has a profound effect on the cash flow for valuation purposes. Too rapid
a depreciation rate tends to underestimate cash flow and too slow a method, tends to
over-state it.

For obvious reasons, the Plaintiffs experts opted for the slowest

depreciation rate and the Defendant's were the fastest. The court would find the most
reasonable depreciation rate would be the oi le nearer the faster i ate allowed b> the
Internal Revenue Service's regulations. The court finds that the fair market value
established by the Defendant's expert of $30,000.00, does not fairly take into
consideration

/ of the business and its performance over time and is more a

liquidation sale price than the sale price of a going concern. From the evidence the
court finds a fair market v<jlm; of the business is approximately $100,000.00. I here is
owing on the business an obligation in the amount of $35,000.00 to First Security Bank.
The court therefore finds the net value of the business is $65,000.00.
34.

The court does not consider the transaction between the Video

Palace and Ms. Stein in 1993 to have been an arms length transaction and therefore the
>nsidered that for valuation purposes.
fhe court finds that in addition to the monies paid to the children,
family expenses have been paid Irmri t l r buslines!, and th.'it family expenses for" other
household supplies, food, transportation and entertainment have been subsidized by the
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business.
36.

The court finds that each of the parties had in their possession

certain furniture and fixtures. The court is unable, based on the evidence, to value these
items.
37.

The court does find that the parlor grand piano in the Plaintiffs

possession was purchased with funds given to her by her parents and is thus a gift from
them. It is not part of the marital estate.
38.

The court finds during the course of the marriage, the Defendant has

acquired certain tools, equipment, personal property and firearms.
39.

The court finds the parties have incurred debts during the course of

the marriage, to-wit: a mortgage on each of the homes, a balance due and owing on the
Video Palace business, a balance due and owing to the Oswald Profit Sharing Plan, the
obligation due on the airplane in the business known as Flying Start, taxes owing on the
Bountiful Blvd. home, the debts the Defendant has incurred since separation to Zions on
the piano and car purchased for Nicole.
40.

The court finds neither of these parties will be able to maintain the

same standard of living that was available while they were residing together. The court
finds that the Plaintiffs requested expenses are unreasonable regarding, the amount that
she claimed for tuition when the court sees no real advantage to additional education,
for entertainment expenses in excess of $100.00 per month, for the children's expenses
in the amount of $200.00 per month in light of her obligation to pay child support and for
vacation expenses of $150.00 per month. Taking these into consideration, the court
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finds the Plaintiff has reasonable expenses of $2,724.00 per month.
41.

The court finds the expenses claimed by the Defendant are

unreasonable, that food expense for 3 people in excess of $400.00 oer month is
excessive, particularly in light of the court's finding that the cost ot food, household
supplies, transportation and expenses are subsidized to some extent by the Video
Palace as valid business expenses, the clothing expense, in excess of $ 100.00 per
month is also unreasonable, as is a dental and medical expense of $150.00 per month
where each of the parties carry health and dental insurance.

Entertainment expenses

in excess of $100.00 per month is also unreasonable given the manner in which the
business expenses are handled. The court further finds the obligation on Nicole's car
is a voluntary obligation incurred by the Defendant after separation and tl tat ai ly sin 11 for
Nicole's car in excess of $175.00 per month is excessive, given the circumstances of
these parties. The court further finds that the deduction of $400.00 per month for a new
car for the Defendant is also excessive given tlle circumstances of the parties. The
court further excludes the payment to Zions Bank for the piano which was purchased
after the date of separation, the court considers it frivolous. The court further finds that
a claim of $150.00 per month for allowances for the children is unreasonable in light of
their history of employment with the business. The mortgage payment claimed

ie

Defendai if is in excess f<s the sum of $483.00 per month (based on the award of the
property made by the court).

Based on the foregoing analysis, the court finds a

reasonable expense for Ihe Ltefonihnt is approximately $4,000.00 per month.
42.

The Plaintiff has a net income of $1,588.00 per month plus $300.00
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from a rental of a room in the home. In addition, she should receive approximately
$300.00 per month in interest income from funds that the court has determined it will
award to her. Even with this income, the court has found that she is without sufficient
funds to meet her reasonable expenses.
43.

The court has determined the Defendant has wages of $6,000.00 per

month with a net income of $4,500.00 to $4,700.00 per month, not including monies
which he is able to receive from the business or money that he saves by subsidizing
family obligations through business expenses. In addition, he will have child support
from the Plaintiff in the sum of approximately $300.00 per month.
44.

The Defendant has incurred attorney's fees of $20,653.00 based on

a total of 165 hours attributed by counsel and co-counsel.
45.

The court finds the Plaintiff has incurred attorney's fees of

approximately $30,000.00 based on 319 hours having been contributed by two attorneys
and two paralegals. Mrs. Jefferies did much of the computations as to the graphs and
business expenses offered into evidence by the Plaintiff.
46.

The court finds that this case was not extremely complicated, it did

have certain novel issues as to the retirement and unusual factual issues* regarding the
family business and its value. However, the court finds that to have spent 319 hours on
this particular case is unreasonable. The court finds that given the complexity of the
case, the nature of the issues, the results obtained, that 150 hours is a reasonable
amount of time to be spent on this case by an attorney who is knowledgeable in the area
of domestic relations as these two attorneys are. A reasonable attorney's fee would be
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$125.00 per hour.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters the
following
CONCLUSION OF LAW
1.

The court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this

2.

Each of tl le parties should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from the

action.

other on the grounds of irreconcilable differences the same to become final upon signing
and entry.
3.

The care, custody and control of the minor children of the parties

should be awarded to the Defendant as stipulated *by the parties.
4.

The Defendant should be enjoined from planning competing activities

for the children on dates of scheduled visitation and from otherwise interfering with
visitation.
5. Visitation is something that will have to be worked out between the
Plaintiff and the children. Recognizing that problem and ihat the children may not 'be
willinc

overnight, the court orders visitation every other Saturday and at least four

hours on an evening during the off weeks. Subject to the foregoing, tlle ecuit t oideis
slancianl visitation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-35.
6. By application of the Uniform Child Support Guidelines of the State of
Utah, the Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant the sum o! $307,00 per month as child
support for the two minor children of the parties. Child support should continue for each
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child until that child attains majority and graduates from high school with his/her regularly
scheduled graduating class. Income withholding provision of Utah Code Ann. 62A-11401 et seq. shall apply.
7.

The Defendant should maintain primary health insurance for the

children subject to that being available through his employment. The parties are to
share any uninsured medical expenses with the Plaintiff paying one-third and the
Defendant paying two-thirds. The Defendant shall pay any regular office and ordinary
medical expenses. The Plaintiff is to share only in the extraordinary uninsured medical
expenses.
8.

The Plaintiff should be awarded the home on Bountiful Boulevard

subject to the mortgage thereon and the equity therein in the amount of $163,6606.00
for the reason that the Plaintiff is presently living in the home and the Defendant
voluntarily removed himself therefrom.

Given the disparity of income between the

parties, it is highly unlikely that Plaintiff could purchase such a home on her own.
Further, by allocating this equity to the Plaintiff, it allows the Defendant to retain a
greater portion of his retirement.
9.

The home of the parties on Elaine Drive should be awarded to the

Defendant subject to the mortgage thereon and together with the equity of approximately
$76,120.00 for the reason that is where the Defendant and the children have been
residing since the separation. It appears to meet their needs. Given the Defendant's
income, he has the capacity to move up if he so desires.
10.

The Plaintiff should be awarded the Subaru Wagon with a value of
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$4,100.00. The Defendant should be awarded the 1986 Olds Toronado with a value of
$2,900.00 and the 1991 Subaru and debt thereon with a net value of $600.00.
11.

The Plaintiff should be awarded the airplane subject to the

indebtedness thereon in the amount of $15,135.00 for an equity of $40,318.00. The
Defendant should be awarded the spare airplane engine. P*oWU)
12.

^ ^ ^
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The Defendant should be awarded his interest in the 9.69 acres and

the one-forth interest in the Jordan Heights Partnership property subject to a lien in the
amount of $28,000.00 to the Oswald Profit Sharing plan, leaving a net equity in those
two parcels of $20,816.00. The Defendant should be further awarded the 8.25 percent
interest in the 26 acres with a net equity of $4,141.00 and the condominium purchased
subsequent to the separation which has an equity of $5,000.00.
13.

The Plaintiff should be awarded the savings account at First Security

Bank in its original sum of $10,995.00 for the reason that she had the use and benefit
of that account during the pendency of these matters and has used certain of those
sums to pay her expenses during that period.
14.

The Plaintiff should be awarded the 401 (K) in the amount of

15.

Each of the parties should be awarded half of the sums in the Dean

$12,716.00.

Witter Reynolds account in the amount of $145,725.00 plus any accrued interest and
dividends. Any income taxes incurred as a result of this division should be born equally
by the parties.
16.

The Plaintiff should be awarded her Beneficial Life policy with a cash
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value of $775.00.
17.

The Defendant should be awarded his Beneficial Life policy with a

cash value of $3,399.00, his Penn Life policy with a cash value of $700.00 and his
Principal Mutual policy with a cash value of $659.00.
18.

The Defendant should be awarded the "Video Palace" together with

the furniture and fixtures, the vehicle and the hot air balloon subject to the indebtedness
thereon of $35,000.00, leaving a net equity of $65,000.00.
19.

The court finds that the retirement program of the Defendant in the

form of a 457 plan and a 401(a) plan are substantially different from social security in
both the rate of return and the ownership interest which the Defendant has in the plans.
That ownership interest allows him to be fully vested in all sums contributed and among
other things allows him to withdraw those sums in lump sum or periodically as he may
choose upon retirement, death or termination and to pass his interest to beneficiaries.
All of these benefits are substantially more favorable than the usual social security
benefits. For that reason, the court does not accord to these retirement benefits the
same protection as is required the federal law for social security. Therefore, the court
concludes that these retirement plans are joint marital property and subject to division
in this proceeding.
20.

The Defendant should be awarded the sums in his 457 plan in the

amount of $233,412.00 free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff.
21.

The Plaintiff should be awarded $201,000.00 of the 401 (a) plan free

and clear of any claim of the Defendant and any interest or accumulation (including
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additional payments) in ratio this fund is divided until actual division occurs. These
should be passed to her by appropriate QDRO which should be entered by the court to
implement this award after entry of the decree of divorce. The Defendant should be
awarded $21,800.00 from the 401(a) plan free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff and
any interest or accumulation (including additional payments) in ratio this fund is divided
until actual division occurs.
22.

The court concludes that the total value of the property previously

awarded should be approximately equal.
23.

Each of the parties should be awarded those items of personal

property presently in their possession together with any furniture and fixtures. The court
finds that they are essentially equal.
24.

Each of the parties should be awarded his or her own personal

property and possessions.
25.

The Defendant should be awarded his tools, power equipment and

sporting goods including firearms free and clear of any claim of the Plaintiff.
26.

The court orders that the tools and equipment used for yard care and

maintenance are to be divided equally between the parties. As an exception to the
court's ruling above, the court orders that Defendant return to the Plaintiff the electric
garage door opener, hose attachments to the vacuum, one of the computers, a CD
player and in the event that there is more than one Sega and Nintendo player, one is to
be returned to the Plaintiff.
27.

The parties are ordered to divide equally any family photographs
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which they may have acquired during the course of their marriage.
28.

The court considers those items of furniture and fixtures used by the

children to be the property of the children.
29.

The court considers that the $17,000.00 initially contributed by the

Plaintiff to the marriage and the $17,000.00 initially invested in the home purchased by
the Defendant to have become marital property. The funds have been co-mingled and
as such have lost their identity as separate premarital property. Therefore, the court
considers them as marital property in the allocation made between the parties herein.
30.

The court finds that stock given to the Plaintiff by her uncle which

has remained in her name has not been co-mingled and is her sole and separate
property and not subject to distribution.
31.

The sums in the children's names at Shearson-Lehman and Lon's

bond are awarded to the children.
32.

The Plaintiff should be ordered to assume and discharge the debt

due and owing on the home in Bountiful Boulevard, including any taxes and the
$15,135.00 debt due and owing on the plane and to hold the Defendant harmless
thereon.
33.

The Defendant should be ordered to assume and discharge the debt

and obligation due on the home on Elaine Drive, the obligation due and owing on the
business, the balance of any sums owing on the airplane in excess of $15,135.00, the
balance due and owing to the Oswald Profit Sharing plan and any other debts or
obligations incurred during the course of the marriage or which he has incurred
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subsequent to the day of separation. The Defendant should be ordered to hold the
Plaintiff harmless thereon.
34.

The court finds that the Plaintiff is in need of additional support to

meet her monthly expenses. Although, the court finds that the Plaintiff will receive
certain interest payments from the funds awarded to her, she will still need additional
support in order to meet her monthly expenses. The court concludes that in light of the
Defendant's income from the Wasatch Front Regional Council, his other investments,
child support he will be receiving and the benefits incident to the ownership of the
business, he is in a position to provide assistance to the Plaintiff by way of support. The
court therefore concludes that the Defendant should be ordered to pay to the Plaintiff the
sum of $700.00 per month as and for alimony.
35.

The court further concludes that a reasonable attorney's fee in this

matter would be $18,750.00, given the difficulty of the case, the issues involved and the
result.

The court concludes that the Plaintiff has the ability to contribute to said

attorney's fees but is without sufficient funds to pay all her fees without a substantial
invasion of the marital estate given her income. The court finds that the Defendant given
his superior earnings ability, has the ability to contribute to such fees and orders that he
does so in the amount of $8,750.00.
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DATED this ^ s * \ j a y of

TVW-

1994.

BY THE COURT:

RODNEY£j PAGE, Distric
rict Court
COL Judge
District
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered this

L

f

r"day of May,

1994 a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
to the following individual:
Rodney R. Parker, Esq.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Counsel for Defendant
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